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SOLOMON'S CHOICE: THE SPENDING CLAUSE AND
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN FORUM FOR
ACADEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS V. R UMSFELD
Emily R. Hutchinson
Abstract: The Solomon Amendment denies federal funding to institutions of higher
education that interfere with military recruiting on campus. In Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
examined the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment using traditional First
Amendment analysis. The court applied strict scrutiny and held that it was reasonably likely
that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly infringed the First Amendment rights of an
association of law schools and law faculty. This Note argues that the Solomon Amendment is
a valid exercise of Congress's constitutionally-mandated duties to spend for the general
welfare and to raise and support an army. Courts have not applied traditional First
Amendment analysis-subjecting certain types of intrusions to strict scrutiny-to exercises
of the spending power that implicate First Amendment rights. Instead, the proper analytical
framework is the four-pronged test from South Dakota v. Dole and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Under this framework, the Supreme Court should reverse the Third
Circuit's decision and hold that the Solomon Amendment is a valid exercise of the spending
power because the Solomon Amendment passes the Dole test and does not impose an
unconstitutional condition on recipients.

The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to condition the receipt of federal funds on
compliance with federal objectives.' However, this power is not without
limits. 2 Under South Dakota v. Dole,3 spending conditions must serve
the general welfare, be unambiguous, be related to the federal interest in
making the expenditure, and be consistent with other constitutional
provisions.4 Additionally, spending conditions that implicate First
Amendment rights must not impose an unconstitutional condition on
recipients.5 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents a
government from retaliating against the exercise of First Amendment

1. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474
(1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-90 (1937).
2. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
3. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
4. Id. at 207-08.
5. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1421-28 (1989) (discussing the elements of an unconstitutional conditions claim).
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rights, attempting to control the content of speech when the purpose of
the expenditure 6is to facilitate private speech, and aiming to suppress
dangerous ideas.
The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 983, is an example of
conditional spending legislation.7 It facilitates Congress's constitutional
duty to raise a military.8 Passed in 1996, the Amendment requires
universities receiving federal funds to provide military recruiters access
equal in quality and scope to that provided to civilian recruiters. 9
Universities that wish to retain federal funding must either provide
military recruiters the same types of access and support afforded civilian
recruiters, or refrain from conducting any on-campus recruiting
campaigns.' 0
The Solomon Amendment forces many law schools to make a
difficult choice." Nearly every accredited law school in the United
States has adopted an antidiscrimination policy that includes sexual
orientation.' 2 Most schools refuse to offer recruiting access or support to.
any employer that discriminates based on protected categories. 13 The
6. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (striking down legislation that
attempted to suppress dangerous ideas); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 834-36 (1995) (striking down content-based regulation in program to facilitate private
speech); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 391 (1984) (striking down
content-based regulation in program to facilitate private speech); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
357-58 (1976) (striking down patronage as impermissible retaliation); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (discussing impermissible retaliation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 52627 (1958) (striking down California statute that aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas).
7. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West Supp. 2005) (denying specified federal funds ifa university interferes
with military recruiting on its campus).
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 12-13; 142 CONG. REc. 12,712 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Goodlatte) ("It is simply sound fiscal policy to deny Federal dollars to schools that interfere with the
Federal Government's constitutionally mandated function of raising a military."); 141 CONG. REC.
595 (1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[J]ustice demands that we not give taxpayer dollars to
institutions which are interfering with the Federal Government's constitutionally mandated function
of raising a military.").
9. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1).
10. See id. § 983(b).
11. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1), 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,
281-82 (D.N.J. 2003) (explaining that many law schools are loath to endorse military recruiting but
face a loss of federal funding if they do not comply with the Solomon Amendment), rev'd Forum
for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I), 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert.
granted,U.S.__, 125 S.Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).
12. Id. at 280 (explaining the bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS),
which require its members to adopt nondiscrimination policies that include sexual orientation).
13. Id. at 280-81 (stating that AALS member schools refuse career services support to employers
who do not sign a certificate of nondiscrimination).
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United States military is an employer that discriminates based on sexual
orientation. 14 Under the Solomon Amendment, law schools must choose
between their desire to retain federal funding and their desire to enforce
antidiscrimination
policies against all employers, including the United
5
States military.
In Forumfor Academic & InstitutionalRights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR/416
an association of law schools and law faculty challenged the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. 17 The association argued
that the Solomon Amendment was an attempt to use spending conditions
to reach a result that Congress could not command directly under the
First Amendment, and thus imposed an unconstitutional condition on the
receipt of federal funds. 18 The district court disagreed and denied the
association's motion for preliminary injunction.' 9 On appeal,2 ° the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that
traditional First Amendment analysis was the proper analytical
framework, applied strict scrutiny, and ordered the district court to
enjoin enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.21
This Note argues that the Third Circuit improperly analyzed the
Solomon Amendment as a direct regulation of speech and association
and erred in applying strict scrutiny. The Solomon Amendment is a valid
exercise of the spending power under the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Dole. Moreover, the Solomon Amendment does not impose
an unconstitutional condition on law schools because it is justified by an
independent regulatory power of Congress: the power to raise and
support a military. Part I explains the scope of the spending power and
Dole's four-pronged test to analyze the constitutionality of spending
conditions. Part II summarizes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Part III discusses Congress's broad regulatory powers under Article I's
military clauses. Part IV explains the Solomon Amendment and provides

14. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (excluding from military service those who engage in, attempt to
engage in, have a propensity to engage in, or intend to engage in homosexual acts).
15. See FAIR 1,291 F. Supp. 2d at 281-82.
16. 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
_

U.S.

-

125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).

17. Id. at 297.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 322.
20. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 2005).
21. Id. at 230, 246.

U.S. -

125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2,
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a history of the FAIR litigation. Part V argues that the Third Circuit erred
in applying strict scrutiny because the Solomon Amendment is valid
conditional spending legislation under Dole and does not impose an
unconstitutional condition on universities or their law schools. Part VI
concludes that the law schools and their parent institutions must comply
with the requirements of the Solomon Amendment and provide military
recruiters access equal in quality and scope to that provided to civilian
recruiters because they have accepted federal funds pursuant to valid
conditional spending legislation.
I.

CONGRESS MAY CONDITION RECEIPT OF FEDERAL
FUNDS ON COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY DIRECTIVES

The Constitution entrusts Congress with broad powers to spend for
the common defense and general welfare of the nation, and wide latitude
to determine federal spending priorities.22 Congress may enact
conditional spending legislation and require recipients of federal funds
to comply with congressional policies that recipients otherwise have no
duty to honor. 23 In Dole, the Court announced a four-pronged test to
measure the constitutionality of conditional spending legislation.24
A.

CongressHas Wide Latitude to Determine FederalSpending
Prioritiesand to Fix the Terms Upon Which FederalFundsAre
Disbursed

Congress possesses broad powers under the Spending Clause.25 The
Spending Clause empowers Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties,

22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
23. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (upholding conditional
spending legislation that required public libraries to install internet filters on library computers);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-99 (1991) (upholding conditional spending legislation that
required healthcare providers to refrain from engaging in abortion-related activities); Grove City
Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (upholding conditional spending legislation that required
universities to comply with federal legislation barring discrimination based on sex); Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 474-75 (upholding conditional spending legislation that required grantees to spend at least
10% of federal funds to procure services or supplies from minority businesses); Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (upholding conditional spending legislation that required school districts to
take any measures necessary to bar discrimination based on race); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (upholding conditional spending legislation that required
employees of states or local agencies to refrain from participating in political activities).
24. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1;Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474.
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Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States. 26 Courts have not
27
limited Congress's spending power to Article I's enumerated powers.
Rather, courts have interpreted the spending power broadly to allow
Congress to legislate directly under the Spending Clause.28
Congressional determinations related to federal spending, including the
prudence of a particular expenditure and the selection of particular
entities as beneficiaries of federal funding, are a matter of policy not
generally suited to judicial review. 29 Federal spending is largely
and Congress may allow or disallow expenditures as it
discretionary,
0
sees fit.

3

Congress's broad spending powers include the power to place
conditions on the receipt of federal funds and to require recipients to
comply with federal policies. 31 By conditioning the receipt of federal
funds on compliance with federal policies, Congress induces recipients
of federal funds to cooperate with policies that recipients otherwise have
no duty to honor.3 2 Conditional spending legislation is contractual: when
recipients voluntarily and knowingly accept federal funds, they agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions.33 Thus, in some
circumstances, Congress may accomplish results it could not command
directly by specifying the conditions upon which recipients accept
federal funds.34
B.

In Dole, the CourtAnnounced a Four-ProngedTest to Assess the
Constitutionalityof Spending Conditions

In Dole, the Court explored the constitutional limits of Congress's
spending power. 35 The Court upheld federal legislation that withheld a
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding that the spending power is
not limited by the direct grants of legislative power enumerated in Article I, Section 8).
28. Id.
29. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
30. See Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
31. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
474 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974).
32. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474.
33. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
34. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 196-99 (1991); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984); Lau, 414 U.S. at 569.
35. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-08.
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percentage of federal highway funds from states that refused to raise
their mandatory minimum drinking age to twenty-one years.3 6 In
reaching its decision, the Court announced a four-pronged test to assess
the constitutionality of spending conditions. 37 First, the exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare.38 Second, the
condition must be sufficiently unambiguous to ensure that recipients of
federal funds know the conditions they are accepting. 39 Third, the
condition must be related "to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs. ' ' 40 Finally, other constitutional provisions must not
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. 41
Although Congress could not directly command states to increase their
minimum drinking ages, the legislation was a valid exercise of the
spending power.42
In practice, all conditional spending legislation meets the first prong's
requirement.4 3 Reviewing courts must defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress in this area. No court has ever struck spending
legislation on the ground that the legislation did not serve the general
welfare.45
The second prong's prohibition on ambiguous spending conditions
36. See id. at 205.
37. Id. at 207-08.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion))
(noting prior suggestions by the Court that a condition may be illegitimate if it is unrelated to the
federal interest).
41. Id. at 208. The fourth prong of the Dole test prohibits a government from compelling a
funding recipient to violate the constitutional rights of third parties, while the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, discussed infra Part II, prevents a government from requiring a funding
recipient to waive its own constitutional rights as a condition of receiving government funding.
Compare id. at 210-11 (explaining that the fourth prong of the Dole test prevents Congress from
requiring a state receiving federal funds to violate the constitutional rights of its citizens), with
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (describing public libraries'
unconstitutional conditions claim that the challenged statute "require[ed] them, as a condition on
their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to provide the public with
access to constitutionally protected speech") (emphasis added).
42. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209-11.
43. See generally Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Offthe Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do
So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 464 (2003) (gathering cases where courts have cursorily found that spending
conditions serve the general welfare).
44. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
45. See Baker & Berman, supra note 43, at 464 & n.34.
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46
relates to the contractual nature of conditional spending legislation.
Conditional spending legislation becomes an enforceable "contract"
when a recipient of federal funds voluntarily and knowingly accepts its
terms by receiving federal funds.47 Thus, when Congress imposes a
condition on the receipt of federal funds, it must do so explicitly and
unambiguously so that recipients know the conditions to which they are
agreeing.48
The third prong requires that spending conditions be reasonably
49
calculated to advance a federal policy interest. In Dole, the Court
refused to define the outer bounds of this prong's relatedness
requirement. 50 In a subsequent case, the Court reaffirmed the Dole
Court's expansive definition of relatedness and explained that spending
conditions must bear some relation to the purpose of the federal
expenditure. 5 ' Unless spending conditions "ha[ve] nothing to do with"
the expenditure, the conditions satisfy the
the federal interest in making
52
third prong of the Dole test.
The fourth prong prevents Congress from using the spending power to
53
induce recipients to engage in unconstitutional activities. Thus, if
Congress passed conditional spending legislation that required the States
to inflict cruel and unusual punishment or invidiously discriminate, the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, would pose an
independent bar.54 However, as long as Congress does not induce
recipients to engage in unconstitutional activities, it may achieve
indirectly via the spending power results it could not command

46. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (emphasizing the importance of federal funding recipients
"'exercis[ing] their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation."
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))); Halderman,451 U.S.
at 17 (explaining that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions").
47. Halderman,451 U.S. at 17.
48. Id.
49. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
50. Id. at 208 n.3.
51. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
52. See id. (explaining that a criminal statute prohibiting bribery of governmental officials
employed by entities receiving federal funds is sufficiently related to the federal interest in
appropriating funds for state and local governments).
53. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
54. Id. at 210-11.
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directly.5 5
In sum, the broad powers Congress possesses under the Spending
Clause include the power to condition the receipt of federal funds upon
recipients' compliance with federal policies. Spending conditions are
constitutional if they satisfy the Dole test. The expenditure must serve
the general welfare, as defined by Congress itself. The condition must
unambiguously propose the terms of the contract so that recipients can
make a knowing choice whether to accept federal funds. The condition
must be reasonably calculated to advance a federal policy interest.
Finally, the condition must not' induce recipients to act
unconstitutionally.
II.

SPENDING LEGISLATION MUST NOT IMPOSE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION

In addition to passing the Dole test, spending conditions that
implicate First Amendment rights must not violate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.56 Courts apply strict scrutiny to spending conditions
that implicate First Amendment rights in three circumstances.5 7
However, strict scrutiny does not apply every time spending conditions
implicate First Amendment rights. 58 Strict scrutiny does not apply when
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203-07 (2003) (applying the
Dole test); id. at 210-12 (analyzing the unconstitutional conditions claim). Although somewhat
similar in language, the fourth prong of the Dole test and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
constitute independent constitutional inquiries. The fourth prong of the Dole test prohibits a
government from compelling a funding recipient to violate the constitutional rights of third parties,
while the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents a government from requiring a funding
recipient to waive its own constitutional rights as a condition of receiving government funding.
Compare Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11 (explaining that the fourth prong of the Dole test prevents
Congress from requiring a state receiving federal funds to violate the constitutional rights of its
citizens), with United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (describing public
libraries' unconstitutional conditions claim that the challenged statute "require[ed] them, as a
condition on their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First Amendment right to provide the
public with access to constitutionally protected speech") (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-44, 549 (2001) (discussing why
the "latitude" that normally applies to federal conditional spending legislation does not apply to
statutes that aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364, 380-84 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to the challenged statute after finding that
strict scrutiny applies when a statute appropriates funds to facilitate private speech and discriminates
based on content); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to the
practice of retaliating against public employees who failed to affiliate with ruling political party).
58. See Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 211-12; Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 585 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,
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the purpose of a federal expenditure is to develop a federal spending
59
program and spending conditions limit the scope of that program, nor
does it apply to spending conditions that are independently justified by a
regulatory power of Congress.6 ° In these circumstances, rational
61
spending conditions do not impose an unconstitutional condition.
A.

Spending ConditionsMust Survive Strict Scrutiny in Three
Circumstances

The Court applies strict scrutiny to conditional spending legislation
62
that implicates First Amendment rights in three circumstances. First,
governments may not retaliate against individuals who exercise their
First Amendment rights.6 3 Second, a government may not limit the
content of speech when the purpose of the expenditure is to facilitate
private speech. 64 Third, governments may not discriminate in their
funding to aim at the suppression of "dangerous ideas" by inducing
65
recipients to abandon speech critical of the government.

575-76 (1984).
59. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 211-12; Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
60. Bell, 465 U.S. at 575-76; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474, 478, 490 (1980); Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974).
61. See Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 211-12 (upholding spending legislation that limits the
scope of a federal spending program); Finley, 524 U.S. at 588-90 (same); Rust, 500 U.S. at 196
(same); see also Bell, 465 U.S. at 575-76 (upholding spending legislation that is independently
justified by a congressional regulatory power); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474, 478, 490 (same); Lau,
414 U.S. at 569 (same).
62. In these circumstances, the government must prove that the spending condition is narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. If the spending condition does not survive
strict scrutiny review, the condition is unconstitutional. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541-44,
549 (applying strict scrutiny to a statute that aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas); League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380-81 (applying strict scrutiny to a statute that facilitated private
speech and discriminated based on content); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362-63 (applying strict scrutiny to
the practice of retaliating against public employees who failed to affiliate with ruling political
party).
63. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
64. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995); League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375-78, 390-91, 396-97.
65. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 548-49; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)
(quoting Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
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Strict Scrutiny Applies to Spending Conditions When a
GovernmentRetaliatesAgainst IndividualsSolely Because They
Have Exercised Their FirstAmendment Rights

A government or its officials may not retaliate against individuals
who exercise their First Amendment rights.66 Although governments
enjoy

wide

discretion

in

distributing

public

benefits,

the

First

Amendment prevents governments from denying benefits as a means of
penalizing or inhibiting protected speech and association.6 7 If the only

possible effect of a denial is to penalize or inhibit protected speech or
association, the denial must survive strict scrutiny.6 8
2.

Strict Scrutiny Applies to Spending Conditions When a
GovernmentFacilitatesPrivateSpeech and DiscriminatesBased
on Content

A government may not limit a public forum it has created or restrict
the content of private speech it subsidizes if the limitation or restriction
does not survive strict scrutiny. 69 In Federal Communications
7°
Commission v. League of Women Voters of California,
owners and

operators of noncommercial broadcasting stations brought a First
Amendment challenge to a provision of the federal Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967, which prohibited public broadcasting stations that received

federal funds from engaging in editorializing. 7' The Court found the

66. See, e.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57 (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals,
whereby a state official fires a member of an opposing political party for failing to affiliate with the
official's own party, violates the First Amendment); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98 (remanding for trial
where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether a state college system refused to renew a
teacher's employment contract in retaliation for the teacher's outspoken criticism of its Regents).
67. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360 (explaining that denials are permitted for appropriate reasons);
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (discussing cases where denials were unconstitutional because they
impermissibly penalized the exercise of First Amendment rights).
68. See, e.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363 (stating that denials must be the least restrictive means of
furthering a vital governmental interest and that the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of
constitutionally protected rights).
69. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 391 (stating that the risk that local
editorializing would jeopardize balanced coverage of public issues cannot justify a broad
suppression of editorial speech when radio station programs are as "distinctive, varied, and
idiosyncratic as the various communities they represent").
70. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
71. Id. at 370-71 (discussing challenged provision of Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (current version at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-399 (West Supp. 2005)).
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challenged provision unconstitutional.72 The purposes of the federal
expenditure were to facilitate balanced coverage of public issues, foster
the growth and development of local broadcasting stations, and preserve
the traditional autonomy of the broadcast media. 73 Because the stations'
editorial policies were bound to be as diverse as their communities, the
Court reasoned that any risk that editorializing would jeopardize
balanced coverage of public issues was insufficient to justify such a
broad suppression of speech.74
3.

Strict Scrutiny Applies to Spending Conditions When a
Government Aims to Suppress "DangerousIdeas"

A government may not discriminate in its funding to aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas.7 5 When a government uses its spending
power to induce individuals to forego protected speech challenging or
criticizing the government, the government aims at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.76 Although Congress may fix the terms upon which it
distributes federal funds, Congress may not attempt to induce recipients
into abandoning speech critical of the government.7 7 The First
Amendment protects an individual's right to speak critically of the
government, and any governmental attempts to suppress the exercise of
that right are unconstitutional unless they survive strict scrutiny.7 8
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 79 law firms brought a First
Amendment challenge to a provision of the Legal Services Corporation

72. Id. at 402.
73. Id. at 386-87.
74. Id. at 391.
75. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (striking down a provision
of the Legal Services Corporation Act that impeded judicial review of existing welfare laws by
prohibiting law firms receiving federal funds from attempting to amend or challenge those laws);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (striking down a portion of the California tax
assessment form that required taxpayers to affirm that they would not advocate for the overthrow of
the United States or California governments). However, as long as a government does not
discriminate in its funding to aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas, it does not impose an
unconstitutional condition by refusing to subsidize the exercise of First Amendment rights. See
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1983) (upholding a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code that denied § 501(c)(3) tax exemptions to organizations
engaging in lobbying activities).
76. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 546; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518-19.
77. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 548-49.
78. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 520, 525.
79. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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Act that prohibited law firms receiving federal funds from challenging
existing welfare laws. 80 The Court found the provision
unconstitutional. 81 The purpose of the federal expenditure was to
facilitate lawyers' private speech on behalf of their indigent clients, and
the provision at issue was inconsistent with the ethical duty of lawyers to
bring all viable claims on behalf of their clients. 82 Moreover, the
provision aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas and violated
accepted separation-of-powers principles by insulating federal welfare
statutes from judicial inquiry.8 3
B.

Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply When the Purpose of a Federal
ExpenditureIs to Develop a FederalSpending Programand
Spending ConditionsLimit the Scope of the Program

The Court does not apply strict scrutiny to spending conditions that
limit the scope of a federal spending program. 84 When Congress creates
a federal spending program for a particular purpose, it is entitled to insist
that recipients use federal funds for that purpose and not for alternate
purposes. 85 Although the First Amendment may protect activities outside
the scope of the federal spending program, Congress does not impose an
unconstitutional condition on recipients by refusing to subsidize those
activities. 86 If recipients wish to exercise their First Amendment rights
and to engage in activities outside the scope of the federal spending
program, they are free to avoid the condition by declining federal
87
financial assistance.

80. Id. at 536-38 (discussing challenged provision of the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2996-29961 (West. Supp.
2005))).
81. Id. at 549.
82. Id. at 544-45.
83. Id. at 546.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206-08 (2003) (declining to
apply forum and prior restraint analyses to funding decisions related to public library acquisitions);
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (stating that Congress has wide
latitude to set spending priorities when making appropriations for publicly-funded artworks); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (explaining that unconstitutional conditions cases applying
strict scrutiny are inapposite when spending conditions limit the scope of a federal spending
program).
85. See Am. Library Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 211-12; Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94.
86. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196, 198.
87. Id. at 198-99.
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In United States v. American LibraryAss 'n, 88 the Court confirmed the
relevance of the Dole test in the unconstitutional conditions context and
reiterated that when Congress appropriates funds for a particular
purpose, it is entitled to insist that recipients use the funds for that
purpose. 89 The case arose when a group of library associations and
libraries challenged provisions of the Children's Internet Protection Act
(CIPA) that required libraries receiving federal funds to install internet
filters on each of their computers. 90 The Court found these provisions
constitutional. 91 The Court applied Dole's four-pronged test and
emphasized that traditional First Amendment analysis is inapplicable92
rights.
when a spending condition requires waiver of First Amendment
Because CIPA did not induce the libraries to violate their patrons' First
Amendment rights, the spending condition was consistent with the First
Amendment under Dole's fourth prong. 93 Moreover, CIPA did not
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.94 The purpose of the
federal expenditure was to facilitate research, learning, and recreational
pursuits by furnishing to libraries materials of requisite and appropriate
quality.95 Because Congress was entitled to insist that libraries spend
funds only for that purpose, the spending condition was constitutional.9 6
Libraries that did not want to comply with the condition were free to
refuse federal funds and provide unfiltered access.9 7
C.

Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply When the Purposeof the Federal
ExpenditureIs to Entice Voluntary Compliance with Independently
JustifiedFederalPolicies

The Court does not subject spending conditions that entice voluntary
compliance with independently justified federal policies to strict
88. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
89. Seeid. at203,211-12.
90. Id. at 200-01 (discussing Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(4),
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-340 (2000) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134 (West Supp. 2005)).
91. Id. at 214.
92. See id. at 203 n.2 (applying the Dole test); id. at 205 (rejecting public forum principles); id. at
209 n.4 (eschewing traditional First Amendment principles relied upon by the dissenting justices).
93. Id. at 207-09 (discussing the purpose of content-based criteria in library acquisitions and the
ease with which library patrons may have filtering software disabled).
94. Id. at 211-12.
95. Id. at 206, 211.
at 211-12.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 212.
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scrutiny.9 8 A federal policy is independently justified if it is warranted
by a congressional regulatory power other than the Spending Clause. 99
The Court has upheld conditional spending legislation, including
legislation that implicates First Amendment rights, that is independently
justified by one of Congress's regulatory powers.100 Congress may deny
federal funding to entities or individuals that refuse to comply with
independently justified federal policies for several reasons. 101 First, the
success of independently justified federal policies often depends on
broad coverage and uniform compliance. 10 2 Second, Congress need not
subsidize protected speech that is contrary to, or undermines the success
of, independently justified federal policies. 0 3 Finally, entities or
individuals that wish to exercise their First Amendment rights by
104
refusing to comply may do so without federal financial assistance.
The Fourteenth Amendment provided an independent justification for
the Court's expansive interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in Lau v. Nichols.10 5 Title VI prohibits all programs or activities
receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating based on

98. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474, 478, 490 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563,
568-69 (1974).
99. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474,478, 490; Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69.
100. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (explaining that Title IX's
spending condition is justified by Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers and does not infringe
First Amendment rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (explaining
that denying tax-exempt status to organizations that discriminate based on race is justified by
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers and does not violate the First Amendment); Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 476, 478, 490 (explaining that requiring set-asides for minority businesses is justified by
Congress's Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment powers); Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69
(explaining that Title VI's spending condition is justified by Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
powers).
101. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 564, 575; Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 594-96; Lau, 414 U.S. at 56669.
102. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 564 (recognizing the need for broad interpretation and application of
antidiscrimination statutes); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 594-96 (explaining that providing tax
subsidies to organizations that discriminate based on race is "wholly incompatible" with public
policy to eradicate discrimination); Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-68 (holding that even unintentional
discrimination comes within Title VI's broad prohibition on discrimination based on race).
103. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 569 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6543 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey (quoting President Kennedy's message to Congress, June 19, 1963))) (affirming that
Congress need not spend public funds on programs that "encourage[], entrench[], subsidize[], or
result[] in racial discrimination" in light of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme to eradicate
discrimination).
104. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 575.
105. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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race. 10 6 In Lau, non-English-speaking students of Chinese ancestry
brought a class-action lawsuit against officials of a California school
district because the district did not provide English-language
instruction. 10 7 The Court declined to reach the plaintiffs' Equal
°8
Protection argument and granted relief based solely on Title VI.' The
school district's unintentional discrimination came within Title VI's
broad prohibition because the statute and its implementing regulations
barred actions that had the effect of discriminating based on race. 1°9
to subsidize
Moreover, the Court reasoned that requiring Congress
10
actions that the statute impliedly barred was unjust."
The Court has upheld independently justified federal spending
legislation against First Amendment challenges on at least two
occasions.111 In Grove City College v. Bell,"2 the Court relied on
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers to expansively interpret a
regulation implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, which prohibited all programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance from discriminating based on sex. 1 3 A private
college, which enrolled students receiving federal aid but refused all
direct federal aid, refused to execute an Assurance of Compliance with
Title IX. 114 The Court held that enrolling students who received federal
financial assistance triggered Title IX coverage and that the university
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000).
107. Lau, 414 U.S. at 564.
108. Id. at 566.
109. Id. at 568.
110. See id. at 569 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey (quoting
President Kennedy's message to Congress, June 19, 1963))) (affirming that Congress need not
spend public funds on programs that "encourage[], entrench[], subsidize[], or result[] in racial
discrimination" in light of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme to eradicate discrimination).
11. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (enforcing provisions of Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 that required educational programs receiving federal funds to
declare that they did not discriminate based on sex); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983). In Bob Jones, the Court upheld an IRS interpretation of provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code that denied tax-exempt status to private universities that discriminated based on race
because of genuine religious beliefs. Id. at 604-05. The Court cursorily applied strict scrutiny and
found the interpretation constitutional. Id. at 603-04. Given the Court's subsequent Free Exercise
jurisprudence, it is unlikely the Court would apply strict scrutiny on the facts of Bob Jones today.
See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding that strict scrutiny
only applies to laws of general applicability that implicate Free Exercise rights when hybrid rights
are involved).
112. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
113. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West Supp. 2005).
114. Bell, 465 U.S. at 559-61.
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had to execute the Assurance to retain federal funding. 115 The Court
reasoned that Title VI and Title IX (which is patterned after Title VI)
each contemplate broad coverage to accomplish their underlying goals,
and Congress did not intend to exempt from coverage one of the primary
1 16
components of federal financial assistance to universities and students.'
Moreover, the regulation did not constitute an unconstitutional condition
because Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous
conditions to federal financial assistance. 17 Although the college may
have had a First Amendment right to discriminate based on sex or to
refuse to execute an Assurance of Compliance, conditioning the receipt
of federal funds on compliance with independently justified
antidiscrimination policies did not violate the right. 1 8 By terminating its
involvement in all federal financial assistance, including federal
financial assistance to enrolled students, the college could exercise its
First Amendment right to refuse to execute the Assurance.' 19
In sum, the Court subjects spending conditions that implicate First
Amendment rights to strict scrutiny in three circumstances. A
government may not retaliate against the exercise of First Amendment
rights, or limit the content of private speech it subsidizes, or discriminate
in its funding to aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas. In contrast,
strict scrutiny does not apply to spending conditions that limit the scope
of a federal program or to spending conditions that entice voluntary
compliance with independently justified federal policies. A federal
policy is independently justified if it is warranted by a congressional
regulatory power other than the Spending Clause.
III.

CONGRESS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY AND
OBLIGATION TO RAISE AND SUPPORT A MILITARY

Article I of the United States Constitution entrusts regulation of the
military to the Legislature. 2 ° Congress is empowered to declare war, to
raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make
rules to regulate the land and naval forces. 12 1 In addition, the
115. Id. at 574-75.

116. Id. at 566-69.
117. Id. at 575.
118. Id. at 575-76.

119. Id.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
121. Id.
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Constitution charges Congress with providing for the common defense
necessary and
and general welfare of the nation and for making all laws
22
proper for carrying into execution its Article I powers.1
For over 200 years, courts have deferred substantially to the judgment
of Congress when reviewing statutes and regulations related to the
Article I military powers. 123 Congress, rather than the judiciary, is
considered competent to assess the needs of the military and balance
those needs against conflicting interests of servicemembers or
civilians. 124 This is particularly true in the military recruitment context;
the constitutional powers of Congress to raise and support armies and
make all laws necessary and proper to that end are exceptionally
broad. 25 In United States v. O'Brien,126 the Court reinstated the
conviction and sentence of a man who knowingly burned his Selective
127
Service registration certificate on the steps of a Boston courthouse.
The Court held that the national interest in having a system for raising
armies that functions with maximum efficiency justified the
conviction. 128 Moreover, despite evidence in the record that several
Congressmen intended the criminal statute to target people who burned
their draft cards in opposition to the Vietnam War, 129 the Court was
122. Id. § 8, cls. 1, 18.
123. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (stating that "judicial deference ... is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and
make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged"); John A. Carr, Free Speech in the
Military Community: Striking a Balance Between PersonalRights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F.
L. REV. 303, 307-312 (1998) (explaining that courts defer to congressional judgments with respect
to the military because the Constitution explicitly grants to Congress the power to regulate the
military and because the military is a "separate community"); John F. O'Connor, The Origins and
Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161, 165-67 (2000) (discussing the
historical development of the military deference doctrine).
124. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 508 (1986)).
125. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) ("[T]he Nation has a vital
interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency .... );
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1918) (explaining that the Constitution places no
limitations on Congress's power to use all means necessary and proper to raise and support armies);
see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948) (concluding that the Constitution's
military clauses are to be interpreted broadly).
126. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
127. Id. at 386.
128. Id. at 382.
129. See id. at 383-88 (discussing the statute's legislative history and explaining that the Court
will not strike down otherwise permissible legislation because of alleged impermissible motives on
the part of several Senators).
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unwilling to strike the statute based on an alleged illegitimate motive by
130
several legislators.
IV. IN FAIR, LAW SCHOOLS CHALLENGED THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT
The Solomon Amendment denies federal funds to institutions of
higher education that interfere with military recruiting on campus.13 1 In
FAIR I, an association of law schools and law faculty that wished to bar
military recruiters from law school campuses and retain federal funding
brought First and Fifth Amendment challenges to the Solomon
Amendment. 132 The association argued that the Solomon Amendment
imposed an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds by
requiring law schools to forgo protected speech and associational
rights. 133 Rather than analyzing the Amendment as conditional spending
legislation, the district court analyzed the Solomon Amendment as a
direct regulation of speech. 134 In Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I1), 135 over vigorous dissent, a divided panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that
Spending Clause analysis did not apply, applied strict scrutiny, and
36
ordered the district court to enter the injunction. 1
A.

The Solomon Amendment's Plain Language and Legislative
History Indicate that Its Spending ConditionsFacilitateCongress's
Duty to Raise a Military

The federal government provides funding to institutions of higher
education for a wide range of purposes, including promoting research
and development, increasing national educational attainment,
subsidizing the cost of education to families, ensuring equal access to
higher education and the marketplace, and developing specific training

130.
131.
132.
2004),

Id. at 383.
10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West Supp. 2005).
FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
cert. granted,U.S. -,
125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).

133. Id. at 274.
134. FAIRL 291 F. Supp. 2dat 299.
135. 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted,-

U.S.

-_, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).

136. Id. at 229 n.9 (declining to apply Spending Clause analysis); id. at 242-43 (discussing strict
scrutiny); id. at 246 (remanding for the district court to enter the injunction).
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programs. 137 The Solomon Amendment is conditional spending
legislation that denies federal funding to higher education institutions
that receive federal funds and interfere with military recruiting on
university campuses. 138 It requires that universities, and sub-elements of
universities, provide military recruiters access equal in quality and scope
to that provided civilian recruiters. 39 In pertinent part, the Solomon
Amendment provides:
No funds... may be provided by contract or by grant to an
institution of higher education (including any subelement of
such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines that that
institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy or
practice... that either prohibits, or in effect prevents.., the
Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland
Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to
students... on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting in a
manner that is at least equal in quality and 140scope to the
access... that is provided to any other employer.
The Solomon Amendment does not apply to institutions that have
ceased offending practices or to institutions with a longstanding,
religious-based policy of pacifism.'14 Moreover, Department of Defense
implementing regulations exempt institutions that exclude all recruiters
from campus, only permit recruiters on campus if students express
interest in them, or present evidence of equal access. 142 The Amendment
applies to funds from the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health and
Human Services, Education, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the
National Nuclear Security Administration; the Central Intelligence
Agency; and related agencies. 143 The Solomon Amendment does not
44
restrict federal funds available solely for student financial assistance.
137. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West Supp. 2005) (ensuring equal access to institutions of
higher education by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex); 10 U.S.C.A. § 2031 (West
Supp. 2005) (establishing a Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps); ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES,
BUDGET

OF THE

UNITED

STATES

GOVERNMENT

FY

2006,

at

66-67,

80-81

(2005),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/spec.pdf (setting forth policy purposes of
federal financial assistance to institutions of higher education).
138. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West Supp. 2005).
139. Id. § 983(b)(1).
140. Id. § 983(b).
141. Id. § 983(c).
142. 32 C.F.R. § 216.4 (2005).
143. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(1).
144. Id. § 983(d)(2).
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The Solomon Amendment impliedly allows universities to issue
disclaimers, voice objections to the military's policies, and take other
measures to counteract the military's presence by conditioning receipt of
145
federal funds solely in terms of access.
The Solomon Amendment's legislative history indicates that
Congress passed the Amendment in light of the importance of oncampus recruiting to raising and supporting a well-qualified, allvolunteer military.146 For decades, Congress has relied upon on-campus47
1
recruiting to attract the nation's youth to military service.
Occasionally, military departments, which are statutorily bound to
"conduct intensive recruiting campaigns," 48 have confronted resistance
to military recruiting at institutions of higher education. 49 In response,
Congress included provisions in various appropriations acts that
prohibited distribution of specified federal funds to institutions of higher
education that bar military recruiters from campuses.1 50 In 1995,
Congress again placed restrictions on the distribution of Department of

145. See id. § 983.
146. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-1149 at 79-80 (1972) (summarizing the problem of
resistance to military recruiting on campus); see also 142 CONG. REc. 16,860 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Solomon) ("[R]ecruiting is the key to our all-volunteer military forces ....
Recruiters have
been able to enlist such promising volunteers... by going into high schools and colleges .. ");
id.
at 12,712 (1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("Campus recruiting is a vitally important
component of the military's effort to attract our Nation's best and brightest young people."); 141
CONG. REC. 595 (1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]ith the defense drawdown, recruiting the
most highly qualified candidates from around the country has become even more important."). The
legislative history also contains some indication of several representatives' impermissible motives.
See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. 11,439 (1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("We can begin today by
telling recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that if you do not like the Armed
Forces, if you do not like its policies, that is fine. That is your first-amendment rights [sic]. But do
not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our military recruiters."); id. at 11,441
(statement of Rep. Pombo) ("These colleges and universities need to know that their starry-eyed
idealism comes with a price.... [S]end a message over the wall of the ivory tower of higher
education.").
147. 142 CONG. REc. 16,860 (1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon); id. at 12,712 (1996) (statement
of Rep. Goodlatte).
148. 10 U.S.C.A. § 503(a) (West Supp. 2005).
149. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-1149 at 79-80 (1972); 142 CONG. REC. 16,860 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Solomon); id. at 12,712 (1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
150. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606, 86
Stat. 734, 740 (1972) (restricting distribution of DOD funds); Department of Defense Authorization
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-441, § 510, 84 Stat. 905, 914 (1970) (restricting distribution of DOD
funds); National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 90373, § 1(h), 82 Stat. 280, 281-82 (1968) (restricting distribution of NASA funds).
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Defense funds.' 5' Many universities continued to refuse to allow military
recruiters on campus. 152 Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon
introduced a bill to expand the restriction to include funding from other
government agencies. 5 3 The purpose of the proposed legislation was to
encourage educational institutions to open their campuses to military
recruiters 54and to advance Congress's constitutional duty to raise a
military.
B.

In FAIR I and FAIR II, the Districtand CircuitCourts Analyzed
the Solomon Amendment as a Direct Regulation of Speech and
Association and Applied Strict Scrutiny

In FAIR I, an association of law schools and law faculty brought First
and Fifth Amendment challenges to the Solomon Amendment. 155 The
association argued that strict scrutiny applied because the Solomon
Amendment imposed an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of
federal funds by penalizing the exercise of three First Amendment
rights: academic freedom, freedom of expressive association, and
151. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558, 108
Stat. 2776, 2776 (1994).
U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 1977
152. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, (May 2, 2005).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 595 (1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[J]ustice demands that
we not give taxpayer dollars to institutions which are interfering with the Federal Government's
constitutionally mandated function of raising a military."); 142 CONG. REC. 12,712 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("It is simply sound fiscal policy to deny Federal dollars to schools
that interfere with the Federal Government's constitutionally mandated function of raising a
military.").
155. FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003), revd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005). Many law schools, professors,
2004), cert. granted, and students oppose military recruiting on campus because the military's policy regarding
homosexuals conflicts with the schools' longstanding antidiscrimination policies, which include
sexual orientation as a protected category. See id. at 281-82. However, the price of refusing to
comply with the Solomon Amendment is high: In 2002, the federal government spent nearly $48.5
billion on higher education, including expenditures on higher education programs and research
programs at universities and related institutions. See generally STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 2004-2005, at 137 (2005). Law schools and their members have challenged the
Solomon Amendment as an unconstitutional condition because if a law school enforces its
antidiscrimination policy and bars military recruiters from campus, it and its parent institution risk
losing all federal funding. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 227-28; see also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp.
2d 156, 159-60 (D. Conn. 2005) (summarizing the unconstitutional conditions and First
Amendment claims brought by law school faculty); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F.
Supp. 2d 388, 390-92 (D. Conn. 2004) (summarizing a law student organization's challenges to the
Solomon Amendment on First and Fifth Amendment grounds).
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freedom from compelled speech.156 The district court denied the
association's motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the
association had not established a reasonable likelihood of success on the
57
merits."'
The district court recognized that the Solomon Amendment was an
attempt to attach certain conditions to the receipt of federal funds.' 58
However, the court declined to apply Spending Clause analysis,
believing that such analysis did not apply when legislation implicates
First Amendment rights. 59 Moreover, the court held that the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions failed to provide an analytical framework
because the Solomon Amendment does not define the scope of a federal
spending program. 60 Because it believed law schools were free to take
ameliorative measures to counteract the military's temporary presence
on campus,' 6' the district court considered the incidental effects on the
association's First Amendment rights to be no greater than essential to
further the government's important interest.1 62 The court held that the
163
association was unlikely to prevail on the merits.
156. See FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 297, 317 (summarizing the association's unconstitutional
conditions, academic freedom, expressive association, and compelled speech claims under the First
Amendment and the association's void for vagueness claim under the Fifth Amendment).
157. Id. at 322.
158. Id. at 298.
159. Id. at 299.
160. Id. at 299-300.
161. Id. at 281 (discussing recommendation of the AALS that law schools take ameliorative
measures to resolve the tension between compliance with the Solomon Amendment and the schools'
non-discrimination policies); id. at 305-06 (stating that by taking ameliorative measures to distance
themselves from the nilitary's discriminatory policy, law schools "counteract and indeed
overwhelm the message of discrimination which they feel is inherent in the visits of the military
recruiters"); id. at 314 (explaining that law schools are free to disclaim and even denounce any
endorsement of the military's recruiting policy). Most AALS schools that comply with the access
requirements of the Solomon Amendment issue disclaimers; the University of Washington School
of Law's disclaimer is typical: "The U.S. Military will recruit at the Law School today. The Law
School's non-discrimination policy prohibits any employer using Law School facilities for
recruitment purposes from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. However, the Law
School is compelled by the Solomon Amendment to permit the U.S. Military to use Law School
facilities for recruitment purposes despite its discrimination against gay and lesbian persons. Under
this law, universities that do not allow the U.S. Military access to students for recruitment purposes
lose federal funding. In no way does the Law School condone the U.S. Military's continuing
discrimination against gay and lesbian persons." Statement from Career Services to the Faculty,
Staff, and Students of the University of Washington School of Law (Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with
author).
162. FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
163. See id. at 322 (concluding that the plaintiffs had not established a reasonable likelihood of
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On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed and ordered
the district court to enter the injunction.1 64 In a footnote, the majority
agreed with the district court that there was a limited exception to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine when Congress defines the scope of
a selective spending program, but refused to apply Spending Clause
analysis on the ground that the Solomon Amendment did not fit within
this exception.1 65 Instead, the majority analyzed the Solomon
Amendment as a direct regulation of speech and association and applied
strict scrutiny.166 Because the court believed it was unlikely that the
Solomon Amendment would survive strict scrutiny, the court held that
the association had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits and ordered the district court to enter a preliminary
injunction. 167 The Third Circuit has since stayed the preliminary
injunction pending Supreme Court review. 168 The Court has granted
certiorari. 169
In sum, the Solomon Amendment is conditional spending legislation
that prohibits institutions of higher education that receive federal funds
from interfering with military recruiting on university campuses. Its
plain language and legislative history suggest that its spending
conditions facilitate Congress's constitutionally-mandated duty to raise a
military. In FAIR II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit examined the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment as a
direct regulation of speech and association, applied strict scrutiny, and
ordered the district court to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon
Amendment because the association had demonstrated a reasonable
success on the merits and denying the preliminary injunction).
U.S. _ 125 S. Ct. 1977
164. FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, (May 2, 2005).
165. Id. at 229 n.9.
166. See id. at 233 (holding that under Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 653
(2000), the Solomon Amendment significantly impairs the law schools' associational rights by
interfering with the schools' ability to disseminate their chosen message of non-discrimination); id.
at 240 (holding that under Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 569-81 (1995), the Solomon Amendment compels the schools to propagate,
accommodate, and subsidize the military's recruiting message against their will); see also id. at
243-46 (arguing that the O'Brien expressive conduct test is inapplicable because the Solomon
Amendment directly affects the schools' speech and associational rights).
167. Id. at 246.
168. Order of January 20, 2005, FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) (on file with
clerk), availableat http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/FAIR3CirStay.pdf.
125 S. Ct.
U.S. -,
169. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR Iil), 1977 (May 2, 2005).
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likelihood of success on the merits.
V.

THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT IS VALID CONDITIONAL
SPENDING LEGISLATION

The Solomon Amendment is valid conditional spending legislation
because it meets the four-pronged test articulated in Dole.17 0 Moreover,
although the Solomon Amendment does not define the scope of a federal
spending program, it does not violate the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine because it is independently justified under Congress's military
powers. 171 The Third Circuit mistakenly analyzed the constitutionality of
the Solomon Amendment as if it were direct regulation of the
association's First Amendment speech and associational rights and erred
in applying strict scrutiny.
A.

The Solomon Amendment Is Valid ConditionalSpending
Legislation Under Dole

Because the Solomon Amendment is conditional spending legislation,
Dole provides the proper analytical framework to determine its
constitutionality. 172 The Solomon Amendment does not directly
command that institutions of higher education provide access or
affirmative support to military recruiters. 173 Instead, the Solomon
Amendment encourages universities to comply voluntarily with a
longstanding policy of on-campus military recruiting. 174 Because the
Solomon Amendment does not directly regulate speech and association,
Dole provides the proper analytical framework for assessing the
75
Solomon Amendment's constitutionality. 1

170. See infra Part V.A.
171. See infra Part V.B.3.
172. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 n.2 (2003).
173. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West Supp. 2005).
174. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 16,860 (1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("Recruiters have
been able to enlist such promising volunteers for our Armed Forces by going into high schools and
colleges .... That is why we need this amendment."); 142 CONG. REc. 12,712 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Solomon) ("But because it is an all-voluntary military, our military does need access to be able
to offer these honorable careers to these young men and women."); 141 CONG. REc. 595 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]ith the defense drawdown, recruiting the most highly qualified
candidates from around the country has become even more important."); 140 CONG. REc. 11,438
(1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]e are unable to find enough recruits to fill the current
number of slots, especially with high-caliber students.").
175. See Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 203 n.2; FAIR 1,291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 298 (D.N.J. 2003),
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The Solomon Amendment meets the Dole requirement that exercises
of the spending power serve the general welfare by facilitating
Congress's responsibilities to provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States. 17 6 The Court has recognized the
vital national interest in having effective systems of military
recruiting. 177 The Solomon Amendment furthers this interest by
encouraging institutions of higher education, which are an important
to campuses. 78
historical source of recruits, to allow recruiters access
Moreover, the Solomon Amendment helps the military departments
meet their statutory duty to conduct intensive recruiting campaigns by
recruiters access to
encouraging universities to allow 1military
79
recruits.
potential
traditionally receptive
The Solomon Amendment also meets the Dole requirement that
t8 0 Its plain language
spending conditions be clear and unambiguous.
requires access "equal in quality and scope" to that provided to civilian
recruiters.1 8 1 By accepting federal funds, universities and their subelements know or should know that they are agreeing to provide military
recruiters the same types of access and support civilian recruiters
receive.1 82 Universities and their sub-elements bind themselves to an
enforceable contract to provide equal access by voluntarily and
knowingly accepting federal funds unambiguously conditioned on
providing equal access. 183 If a parent institution accepts federal funds
and thus subjects its law school to the requirements of the Solomon
Amendment, it binds the law school only to provide access equal in
quality and84 scope to that the law school already provides to civilian
recruiters.'
The Solomon Amendment also meets the Dole requirement that

rev'd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted,__ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2,
2005).
176. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
177. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968).
178. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
179. See id. (discussing 10 U.S.C.A. § 503(a) (West Supp. 2005)).
180. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
181. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
182. See id.; FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83 (summarizing military and law school efforts to
clarify the prohibitions).
183. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
184. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1).
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conditional spending legislation relate to a valid federal interest.1 85 The
federal government provides funding to universities for a wide range of
purposes: funding high-quality, cutting-edge research and development,
including defense research and development; increasing national
educational attainment; subsidizing the cost of education to families by
providing financial assistance to parents and students; ensuring that all
students receive equal access to higher education and the marketplace;
and funding specific training programs, including Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC). 186 Requiring schools to provide military
recruiters access equal in quality and scope to that provided to civilian
recruiters ensures that military recruiters have access to students who
have benefited from federally subsidized higher education.1 87 It also
ensures that the government has the opportunity to capitalize on the
research and training programs it has funded. 188 Since the condition is
sufficiently related to the federal interest in higher education
189
expenditures, it is valid under the third prong of the Dole test.
Finally, the First Amendment does not pose an independent
constitutional bar. 190 The Solomon Amendment does not induce law
schools to infringe the First Amendment speech or associational rights of
their members.' 91 The Solomon Amendment does not require that law
schools deny their members, including professors, staff, and students,
their First Amendment rights to refuse to associate with military
recruiters on campus, express their disagreement with federal policy and
the Solomon Amendment, protest military recruiting on campus, or
participate in normal political processes to change federal policy. 92 As

185. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
186. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West Supp. 2005) (ensuring equal access to institutions of
higher education by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex); 10 U.S.C.A. § 2031 (West
Supp. 2005) (establishing a Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps); ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES,
BUDGET

OF THE

UNITED

STATES

GOVERNMENT

FY

2006,

at

66-67,

80-81

(2005),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/spec.pdf (setting forth policy purposes of
federal financial assistance to institutions of higher education).
187. See FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (discussing the disadvantage military recruiters would
face in the absence of the Solomon Amendment).
188. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 12,712 (1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon) (discussing the high
quality of military recruits from high schools and universities); 140 CONG. REC. 11,439 (1994)
(statement of Rep. Solomon) (same).
189. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
190. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
191. See FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06.
192. See id.
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long as they provide access to military recruiters, universities, their subelements, and their members may take any measures they wish to
express their displeasure with the military's policy regarding
homosexuality or with the Solomon Amendment itself. 193 Moreover, the
condition requiring universities and sub-elements to provide access
equal in quality and scope to that provided to civilian recruiters is not
unduly coercive. Its purpose and effect is to increase military recruiting
on campus, not to deter protected speech.1 94 Because the condition does
not induce universities or their sub-elements to violate the First
is not
Amendment rights of their members, and because the condition
195
unduly coercive, it satisfies the fourth prong of the Dole test.
B.

The Solomon Amendment Does Not Violate the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine

The Third Circuit erred in concluding that because the Solomon
Amendment does not define the scope of a federal spending program,
strict scrutiny applies. The Solomon Amendment does not penalize the
exercise of First Amendment rights, facilitate private speech, or aim at
the suppression of dangerous ideas. 196 While the Solomon Amendment
does not limit the scope of a federal spending program, it does not
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it is
independently justified under Congress's military powers197

193. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West Supp. 2005) (conditioning receipt of federal funds solely in
terms of access and impliedly allowing universities to issue disclaimers, voice objections to the
military's policies, and take other measures to counteract the military's presence); FAIR I, 291 F.
Supp. 2d at 305-06, 313-14.
194. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (explaining that without the Solomon Amendment, the
governmental interest in military recruiting would be achieved less effectively).
195. See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608 (holding that the challenged statute was not unduly coercive
because it did not "bring[] federal economic might to bear on [the recipient's] own choices");
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 207-09 (2003) (holding that the challenged
statute did not require public libraries to violate the First Amendment rights of their patrons because
of the ease with which patrons could have internet filters disabled); Dole, 483 U.S. at 210
(discussing constitutional infirmity of hypothetical statutes requiring a recipient of federal funding
to violate third parties' constitutional rights).
196. See infra Part V.B.1.
197. See infra Part V.B.2-.3.
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The Solomon Amendment Does Not Fit Within Any of the Three
Circumstances Where Strict Scrutiny Applies

The Solomon Amendment does not fit within any of the three
categories of conditional spending legislation where the Supreme Court
requires the application of strict scrutiny. When conditional spending
legislation implicates First Amendment rights, strict scrutiny applies in
three situations: when a government retaliates against individuals who
have exercised their First Amendment rights,' 98 facilitates private speech
but discriminates based on content,' 99 or aims at the suppression of
dangerous ideas. z00 Because the Solomon Amendment does not fit
within any of these categories, the government need not prove its
conditions are narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental
2 °1
interest.
The Solomon Amendment is not intended to retaliate against
universities or law schools that exercise their First Amendment rights.20 2
If the denial of a governmental benefit has no purpose other than
penalizing or inhibiting protected speech, the denial is impermissible
retaliation.20 3 Unlike the denials of benefits that the Court has struck
198. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976) (holding that the practice of
patronage dismissals, whereby a state official fires a member of an opposing political party for
failing to affiliate with the official's own party, violates the First Amendment); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (remanding for trial where there was a genuine issue of
fact as to whether a state college system refused to renew a teacher's employment contract in
retaliation for the teacher's outspoken criticism of its Regents).
199. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)
(holding that a public university violates the First Amendment when it subsidizes private speech of
students and discriminates based on content); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 390-91 (1984) (stating that the risk that editorializing would jeopardize public broadcasting
cannot justify a broad suppression of speech).
200. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (striking down the
provision of the Legal Services Corporation Act that prohibited law firms receiving federal funds
from attempting to amend or challenge existing welfare laws); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
528-29 (1958) (striking down the portion of the California tax assessment form that required
taxpayers to affirm that they would not advocate the overthrow of the United States or California
governments).
201. See supra Part II.
202. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 314 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted,U.S. -_, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).
203. See, e.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57 (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals,
whereby a state official fires a member of an opposing political party for failing to affiliate with the
official's own party, violates the First Amendment); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98 (remanding for trial
where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether a state college system refused to renew a
teacher's employment contract in retaliation for the teacher's outspoken criticism of its Regents).
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down as impermissible retaliation, the Solomon Amendment does not
function solely to penalize protected speech and association. 2 ° The
Amendment's stated purpose and logical effect is to increase military
recruiting on campus, not to deter protected speech.2 °5
Nor does the Solomon Amendment facilitate private speech. In
League of Women Voters, a broad suppression of editorial speech was
held to be impermissible given that the purpose of the federal
expenditure at issue was to facilitate the speech of broadcasting stations
across the nation.2 °6 In contrast, the federal expenditures limited by the
Solomon Amendment do not serve a single purpose or facilitate private
speech.2 °7
The Solomon Amendment is not aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas. In Legal Services Corp., the statute at issue aimed to
suppress all speech critical of federal welfare statutes and to insulate
federal welfare law from judicial scrutiny.2 °8 In contrast, the Solomon
Amendment does not aim to suppress speech critical of the
government.20 9 It aims to entice voluntary compliance with a
congressional determination that access to campuses is necessary to
conduct successful recruiting campaigns.21 Universities and law schools
remain free to engage in speech critical of the government and its
policies, and nearly every law school in the nation that complies with the
access requirements of the Solomon Amendment does so. 21 1 Moreover,
204. Compare Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357 (stating that patronage is inimical to the free functioning of
our electoral process), and Perry, 408 U.S. at 598 (affirming absolute constitutional bar to
terminating public employment contract as reprisal for speech activities), with 142 CONG. REC.
12,712 (1996) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (discussing policy of facilitating government's
constitutionally mandated military duties by withholding federal funds from institutions that
interfere with on-campus military recruiting).
205. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (explaining that without the Solomon Amendment, the
governmental interest in military recruiting would be achieved less effectively).
206. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 386-91 (1984).
207. Compare League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 368-70 (discussing a federal statutory
scheme that established a federal public broadcasting system and appropriated federal funds for that
purpose), with 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West Supp. 2005) (placing restrictions on any funds made
available for the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education,
Homeland Security, and Transportation; the National Nuclear Security Administration; the Central
Intelligence Agency; and related agencies).
208. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001).
209. See FAIR 11, 390 F.3d 219, 262 (3d Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. granted, U.S. -_,125 S.Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005).
210. See id.
211. The University of Washington School of Law's disclaimer is typical: "The U.S. Military will
recruit at the Law School today. The Law School's non-discrimination policy prohibits any
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the Solomon Amendment does not distinguish between universities that
bar military recruiters because of their First Amendment beliefs and
universities that bar military recruiters for reasons unrelated to protected
expression.2 12 Although the Amendment's legislative history indicates
impermissible motives on the part of several legislators, the Court will
not strike otherwise
permissible legislation based on such isolated
21 3
indications.
2.

The Solomon Amendment Does Not Limit the Scope of a Federal
Spending Program

The Third Circuit correctly stated that the Solomon Amendment does
not limit the scope of a spending program.2 14 In American LibraryAss 'n,
the federal expenditure at issue created a spending program to subsidize
the acquisition of library materials of requisite quality.215 The spending
condition prevented libraries from using federal funds in a manner that
would allow for the acquisition of indecent materials. 216 In contrast, the
Solomon Amendment does not create a spending program, and its
conditions do not limit the scope of a spending program.2 17
employer using Law School facilities for recruitment purposes from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation. However, the Law School is compelled by the Sblomon Amendment to permit
the U.S. Military to use Law School facilities for recruitment purposes despite its discrimination
against gay and lesbian persons. Under this law, universities that do not allow the U.S. Military
access to students for recruitment purposes lose federal funding. In no way does the Law School
condone the U.S. Military's continuing discrimination against gay and lesbian persons." Statement
from Career Services to the Faculty, Staff, and Students of the University of Washington School of
Law (Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with author).
212. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983.
213. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968). The legislative history contains
some indication of several senators' impermissible motives. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. 11,439
(1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("We can begin today by telling recipients of Federal money at
colleges and universities that if you do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its policies, that
is fine. That is your first-amendment rights [sic]. But do not expect Federal dollars to support your
interference with our military recruiters."); id. at 11,441 (statement of Rep. Pombo) ("These
colleges and universities need to know that their starry-eyed idealism comes with a price .... [S]end
a message over the wall of the ivory tower of higher education."). It also contains evidence that
many legislators passed the Solomon Amendment because existing recruiting polices were
inadequate to meet the military's recruiting needs. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 595 (1995) (statement
of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]ith the defense drawdown, recruiting the most highly qualified candidates
from around the country has become even more important.").
214. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 229 n.9.
215. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003).
216. Seeid. at211-12.
217. See FAIR 11, 390 F.3d at 229 n.9.
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3.

The Solomon Amendment Is Independently Justified by Congress's
MilitaryPowers

The Solomon Amendment does not violate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine because it is justified by an independent regulatory
power of Congress. 218 In Lau and Bell, Congress's independent
2 19
regulatory powers justified expansive conditional spending legislation.
Although Congress could not have directly commanded compliance with
the statutes at issue in these cases, the financial inducement created by
these statutes was justified by a longstanding national policy, embodied
220
in the Fourteenth Amendment, to eradicate discrimination. Similarly,
the military clauses of the federal Constitution justify the Solomon
Amendment.22 1 Although Congress may not be able to command
compliance with the Solomon Amendment, the financial inducement
created by the Solomon Amendment is justified by a longstanding
national policy to conduct effective military recruiting campaigns,
embodied in Article I's military clauses. 222 As the Court has recognized,
Congress's regulatory powers under the military clauses are
exceptionally broad. 3 Moreover, the governmental interest in effective
systems of military recruiting is of paramount importance to Congress's
22 4
ability to fulfill its constitutional duty to raise and support a military.
For decades, Congress has relied on on-campus recruiting campaigns to
enlist well-qualified men and women.225 Once Congress recognized that
218. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566-68 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448,474, 478,490 (1980); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1974).
219. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 566-68; Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-67.
220. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 566-68; Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 594-96 (1983) (summarizing the national interest, embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment, in eradicating discrimination).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14. Compare Bell, 465 U.S. at 566-68 (discussing the
national interest, embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, in eradicating discrimination), and
Fullilove,448 U.S. at 476, 478 (same), and Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69 (same), with 141 CONG. REC.
595 (1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) (discussing constitutionally-mandated military duties).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14; see FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 312-13 (D.N.J. 2003),
rev'd FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, __ U.S. - 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2,
2005).
223. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948) (stating that the
Constitution's military clauses are to be interpreted broadly); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366, 377-79 (1918) (explaining that the Constitution places no limitations on Congress's power to
use all means necessary and proper to raise and support armies).
224. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) (stating that "the Nation has a vital
interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency").
225. FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 250-51.
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existing recruiting policies were insufficient, it passed the Solomon
Amendment to create a more effective recruiting policy and to increase
military enlistments. 6
Because the Solomon Amendment is independently justified by
Congress's broad regulatory powers under the military clauses, the
government need not prove that the Solomon Amendment is narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. 227 Just as the
college in Bell was not entitled to retain federal funding if it exercised its
First Amendment right to refuse to comply with Title IX, 228 the law
schools challenging the Solomon Amendment are not entitled to retain
federal funding if they exercise their First Amendment right to refuse to
comply with the Solomon Amendment. The national interest in
eradicating discrimination was sufficient to limit the college's First
Amendment right in Bell,229 and the national interest in accessing
university campuses for military recruiting purposes is sufficient to limit
the First Amendment rights of the law schools. Moreover, just as the
college in Bell was free to avoid the condition and fully exercise its First
Amendment rights by foregoing all federal funds,23 ° the law schools and
their parent institutions are free to avoid the conditions of the Solomon
Amendment and fully exercise their First Amendment right to exclude
military recruiters from campus by foregoing federal funds.
In sum, the Solomon Amendment is valid conditional spending
legislation because it meets each prong of the Dole test and does not
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The Solomon
Amendment does not fit within any of the three categories of conditional
spending legislation that require strict scrutiny. Although the Solomon
226. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 16,860 (1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("Recruiters have
been able to enlist such promising volunteers for our Armed Forces by going into high schools and
colleges .... That is why we need this amendment."); 142 CONG. REc. 12,712 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Solomon) ("But because it is an all-voluntary military, our military does need access to be able
to offer these honorable careers to these young men and women."); 141 CONG. REc. 595 (1995)
(statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]ith the defense drawdown, recruiting the most highly qualified
candidates from around the country has become even more important."); 140 CONG. REc. 11,438
(1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("[W]e are unable to find enough recruits to fill the current
number of slots, especially with high-caliber students.").
227. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (upholding conditional spending
legislation that is independently justified by Congress's regulatory powers); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (same); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476, 478, 490
(1980) (same); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (same).
228. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 575.
229. See id. at 566-68.
230. Id. at 575.
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Amendment does not limit the scope of a federal spending program, it is
independently justified by Congress's Article I military powers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In FAIR II, the Third Circuit erred in applying strict scrutiny because
the Solomon Amendment is conditional spending legislation properly
analyzed under Dole's four-pronged test and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The Solomon Amendment is valid conditional
spending legislation under Dole. The Solomon Amendment serves the
general welfare, is unambiguous, is related sufficiently to the federal
interest, and does not require law schools and their parent institutions to
violate the constitutional rights of their members. Moreover, the
Solomon Amendment does not impose an unconstitutional condition on
law schools and their parent institutions because it is independently
justified by Congress's regulatory powers under the military clauses of
the federal Constitution. Although Congress may not be able to compel
law schools and their parent institutions to allow military recruiters on
campus, it may entice them to comply with its determination that
campus recruiting is vital to raising and supporting a well-qualified, allvolunteer military. Because the Solomon Amendment is valid
conditional spending legislation, law schools and their parent institutions
that accept federal funds must comply with the requirements of the
Solomon Amendment and provide military recruiters access equal in
quality and scope to that provided to civilian recruiters.
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